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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Andrew Troy Taylor appeals from the district court's orders relinquishing 
jurisdiction and denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In January 2011, a Twin Falls police officer responded to a hotel room to 
attempt to serve an arrest warrant on Andrew Taylor. (PSI, p.1 1.) There, the 
officer made contact with Taylor's girlfriend, who informed the officer that Taylor 
was not present. (Id.) Because Taylor's girlfriend was on probation, the officer 
searched the room. (Id.) In the course of the search, the officer recovered 
methamphetamine and various drug paraphernalia. (Id.) Taylor was later located 
and admitted ownership of the methamphetamine. (Id.) 
The state charged Taylor with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.50-52.) While he was in pretrial custody on the methamphetamine charge, 
Taylor called his girlfriend and directed her to steal another individual's credit 
card. (PSI, pp.21-24.) The state thereafter additionally charged Taylor with 
felony criminal solicitation. (Id.; Idaho Data Repository, Twin Falls Case No. CR-
2011-02749.) 
Pursuant to plea agreement, Taylor pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine and the state agreed to dismiss the criminal solicitation 
charge. (R., pp.70-81.) Taylor agreed to waive his right to file an I.C.R. 35 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Confidential Exhibits Supreme Court No. 41114-2013." 
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motion seeking to reduce his sentence, and his right to appeal "any issues in this 
case, including all matters involving the plea or the sentencing and any rulings by 
the court, including all suppression issues." (R., p.81 (emphasis in original).) 
The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence with two years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.114-121.) 
Upon the completion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
suspended Taylor's sentence and placed him on probation for three years. (R., 
pp.127-131.) Approximately eight months later, the state filed a report of 
probation violation, in which it alleged Taylor failed to submit to multiple drug 
tests, failed to complete required treatment, failed to pay required fines and fees, 
was charged with driving without privileges, was fired from two jobs, entered an 
establishment where alcohol is a primary source of income, violated his curfew, 
used marijuana and alcohol, and contacted his girlfriend despite his probation 
officer's order not to do so. (R., pp.141-166.) Taylor admitted violating his 
probation. (R., pp.188-193.) The district court revoked Taylor's probation, but 
retained jurisdiction for a second time. (Id.) 
At the conclusion of his second period of retained jurisdiction, the Idaho 
Department of Corrections recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.81-89.) The district court followed this recommendation, 
relinquished jurisdiction, and ordered Taylor's sentence be executed. (R., 
pp.195-199.) 
Less than two weeks later, Taylor filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence. (R., pp.200-201.) Taylor requested that the remainder of his sentence 
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be commuted to indeterminate time so that he could immediately be eligible for 
parole. (Id.) Taylor also asserted that he was "suffering from depression," and 
that "a great deal of his behavior is attributable to his mental state at the time of 
his rider." (Id.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing. (R., 
pp.206-210.) Taylor timely appealed. (R., pp.214-217.) 
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ISSUES 
Taylor states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied Mr. Taylor's Rule 35 Motion without a hearing. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Taylor waived his right to appeal any issues in this case? 
2. In the alternative, has Taylor failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion either by relinquishing jurisdiction or by denying his I.C.R. 35 
motion for reduction of sentence? 
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In this case, the portion of the written plea agreement pertaining to Taylor's 
appellate rights waiver reads as follows: 
By accepting this offer the defendant waives the right to (1) file a 
Rule 35 Motion (except as to an illegal sentence) and (2) appeal 
any issues in this case, including all matters involving the plea or 
the sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all 
suppression issues. However, the defendant may appeal the 
sentence if the Court exceeds the determinate portion of the State's 
sentencing recommendation of the "Jail/Prison terms" set forth 
above. 
(R., p.81 (emphasis in original).) 
Taylor's waiver was broad and ambiguous, and was not limited to direct 
appeals of his conviction and sentence. It instead included appeals of "any" 
issues in this case. Taylor has thus waived his statutory right to appeal the 
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
This Court should therefore dismiss this appeal. 
On appeal, Taylor, citing State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273 
(2013), contends that the scope of his waiver provision does not include appeals 
from court orders entered after the entry of the judgment. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-
9.) However, Straub is distinguishable from the present case. 
Straub's plea agreement contained the following term, in relevant part: 
By accepting this offer the Defendant waives the right to 
appeal any issues regarding the conviction, including all matters 
involving the plea or sentencing and any rulings made by the court, 
including all suppression issues. 
Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d 276. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that this waiver did not preclude Straub 
from appealing the restitution order entered in his case. !sL. at 885-886, 292 P.3d 
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276-277. Specifically, in analyzing the plea agreement, the Court recognized that 
while the phrase "any rulings made by the court" included the court's restitution 
order, the term "made" referred only to rulings that the district court made prior to 
the plea agreement. JiL. No other language in the waiver referenced the 
restitution agreement, and therefore, Straub did not waive his right to appeal it. 
In the present case, Taylor's plea agreement also includes the phrase, 
"any rulings made by the court," which, as in Straub, refers only to rulings that the 
district court made prior to the plea agreement. (R., p.S1.) However, Taylor's 
plea agreement also separately includes the phrase, "any issues in this case, 
including all matters involving the plea or the sentencing." (Id.) Pursuant to this 
portion of the agreement, Taylor waived his right to appeal all matters "involving" 
his sentencing, including matters concerning the district court's relinquishing of 
jurisdiction and the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion. Further, this portion of the 
waiver contains no terminology that limits its scope to court rulings made prior to 
the agreement. 
Additionally, Taylor contends that even if the waiver would otherwise 
preclude his appeal in this case, the state is barred from asserting the existence 
of the waiver because the "respondent in an appeal must file a motion to dismiss, 
prior to the filling of the appel/ate briefing, if it hopes to obtain dismissal of the 
appellant's appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-S (emphasis in original).) In support of his argument, Taylor relies on 
Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105, 503 P.2d 305 (1972). Taylor's reliance on 
Oneida is misplaced. 
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Oneida involved a dispute between shareholders of an Idaho corporation. 
95 Idaho at 105, 503 P.2d at 305. "The pleadings were superseded by a written 
pre-trial stipulation wherein the parties agreed" to certain issues "to be 
determined by the district court." & At the beginning of the hearing to determine 
one of the issues, the court inquired whether its ruling would be an appealable 
order or whether the parties would "stipulate" to "move into the next part of the 
case." & at 106, 503 P.2d at 306. Both parties indicated their willingness to 
stipulate it was not an appealable order. & Despite the stipulation, one party 
filed a notice of appeal after the court resolved the first issue against it. & The 
respondents on appeal argued "the appellant waived their right to appeal the 
district court's order." & In response to this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: 
As the appellants correctly point out, however, an objection based 
upon such a stipulation should be raised by a motion to dismiss the 
appeal. Southern Indiana Power Co. v. Cook, 182 Ind. 505, 107 
N.E. 12 (1914); Speeth v. Fields, 71 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio App. 1946) 
(per curiam); 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 240 (1962); see 
Phelps v. Blome, 150 Neb. 547, 35 N.W.2d 93 (1948); cf 4 
Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error s 241 (1962). Raising such an 
objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare 
the appellant further useless expenditures (for, e.g., an appeal 
bond, transcripts and additional attorneys' fees). Having failed to 
move to dismiss the appeal, the respondents are in no position to 
rely in their appellate brief, upon the alleged waiver of the right to 
appeal. 
Onedia, 95 Idaho at 106-107, 503 P.2d at 306-307 (footnote omitted). 
There are at least two significant differences between Oneida and the 
present case. First, Oneida involved a stipulation that the parties would proceed 
to "move into the next part of the case" rather than pursue an interlocutory appeal 
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of the court's first determination and, therefore, did not involve an appeal waiver. 
The second, but related, difference is that Oneida involved an appeal from an 
intermediate decision by the district court. Unlike Oneida, the waiver at issue in 
the present case involves a plea agreement relating to the disposition of the 
entire case and an appeal from a final judgment. Nothing in Oneida forecloses 
the state's ability to seek dismissal of an appeal short of a pre-briefing motion to 
dismiss where, as here, a final judgment has been entered. Moreover, Oneida 
does not, as Taylor claims, include a pre-briefing motion requirement at al1.2 In 
Oneida, the Idaho Supreme Court merely recognized that "an objection based 
upon ... a stipulation [not to appeal] should be raised by a motion to dismiss the 
appeaL" 95 Idaho at 107, 503 P.2d at 307. The Court then noted that "[r]aising 
such an objection at the earliest stage of appellate proceedings may spare the 
appellant further useless expenditures" such as "an appeal bond, transcripts, and 
additional attorneys' fees." kL. While the identified expenditures would typically 
be incurred prior to briefing, the Court does not define what "the earliest stage of 
appellate proceedings" is and the Court even acknowledges that filing a motion 
to dismiss will not "always spare the appellant" costs associated with an appeal 
since "[a]n appellate court may deny such a motion but nevertheless dismiss the 
2 Taylor characterizes this alleged requirement as a holding. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.6 ("The Idaho Supreme Court held that the respondent in an appeal must file a 
motion to dismiss, prior to the filing of the appel/ate briefing, if it hopes to obtain 
dismissal of the appellant's appeal based on a waiver of appellate rights[.]") 
(italics original, bold added).) The Court, however, ultimately dismissed the 
appeal in Oneida because it was from an unappealable intermediate decision. 
Thus, the Court's discussion of the respondent's obligation to file a motion to 
dismiss the appeal was ultimately dicta since it was not "necessary to the 
decision." State v. Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 *4 (2013). 
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appeal after briefing and argument." Onedia, 95 Idaho at 107 n.2, 503 P.2d at 
307 n.2. Indeed, it is unclear how an appellate court could adequately consider a 
motion to dismiss without the preparation of transcripts and portions of the record 
that would be relevant to the question of waiver. 
Beyond the factual and procedural differences between this case and 
Oneida, the law regarding appellate waivers that has developed since Oneida is 
inconsistent with Taylor's claim that the state is barred from seeking dismissal at 
this juncture. To the extent this Court considers Oneida at all relevant to the 
analysis, it should be disavowed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court "will ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior 
opinions unless it is shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the holding in the 
case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust." State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted). Oneida provides no 
compelling reason to require the state to seek dismissal of an appeal in a 
criminal case at some undetermined time characterized as "the earliest stage of 
appellate proceedings." The only justification apparent from the opinion is that 
requiring as much "may spare the appellant further useless expenditures." 
Oneida, 95 Idaho at 107, 503 P.2d at 307. As previously noted, however, a 
motion to dismiss will not necessarily accomplish this goal because of the need 
to have an adequate record to consider the waiver issue. 
More importantly, it will not always be clear from the outset that an appeal 
would be subject to dismissal as a result of a waiver. In most cases, the 
appellate court must assess the scope and applicability of the waiver first before 
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determining whether a case should be dismissed or whether the issues raised 
should be considered on the merits. 
Further, whatever cost savings a particular defendant might enjoy if the 
state filed a motion to dismiss at "the earliest stage of appellate proceedings" is 
also not particularly persuasive given that it is the defendant's choice to incur 
those costs knowing that he has waived his right to appeal. 
Additionally, both the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals 
have, in numerous cases post-Oneida, considered, after briefing, whether a 
criminal defendant waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement. 
Straub, 153 Idaho at 885-886, 292 P.3d at 276-277; Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 
129 P.3d 1241, 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720; State v. 
Hansen, 2012 WL6634131 *2 (Ct. App. Dec. 19,2012); State v. Rodriguez, 142 
Idaho 786, 133 P.3d 1251 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 270, 
141 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006); Holdaway, 130 Idaho at 484,943 P.2d at 
74. 
"It is not just the prosecutor who is bound by a plea agreement. A 
defendant also is obligated to adhere to its terms, and the State is entitled to 
receive the benefit of its bargain." Holdaway, 130 Idaho at 484,943 P.2d at 74. 
Although the state has already been deprived of part of the benefit of its bargain 
by having to respond to Taylor's appeal at all, it should not be further deprived of 
the benefit of its bargain by having this Court consider the merits of Taylor's claim 
simply because resources have already been expended in relation to this appeal. 
This Court should reject Taylor's argument and dismiss this appeal. 
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II. 
In The Alternative, Has Taylor Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion Either By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Or By Denying His I.C.R. 35 
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
A. Introduction 
As discussed above, Taylor contends that the district court abused its 
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and by denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) Even if Taylor had not 
waived his right to appeal any issue in this case, he has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion in making its sentencing determinations. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); 
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A 
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of 
discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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After reviewing the report and recommendation from the Department of 
Corrections, as well as other files and records associated with Taylor's case, the 
district court elected to relinquish jurisdiction following Taylor's second rider. (R., 
pp.195-199.) The record supports the district court's discretionary decision. 
After performing relatively well on his first rider and earning a positive 
recommendation from the Department of Corrections, the district court 
suspended Taylor's sentence and placed him on probation. (PSI, pp.76-80; R., 
pp.127-133.) Approximately eight months later, the state filed a motion to revoke 
probation, in which it alleged a bevy of probation violations. (R., pp.141-166.) 
Taylor ultimately admitted to violating his probation by failing to attend a required 
treatment program, failing to make monthly payments towards court costs and 
fines, violating the curfew imposed by his probation officer, being fired from two 
places of employment, entering an establishment where alcohol is a primary 
source of income, and for using marijuana. (R., pp.141-150, 187-193.) 
Rather than revoke his probation and impose his sentence, the district 
court gave Taylor the opportunity to participate in a second rider. (R., pp.188-
193.) There, Taylor regressed and performed worse than he did on his first rider. 
The addendum to Taylor's PSI prepared by the Department of Corrections 
summarized, in part: 
I believe at this time that Mr. Taylor would struggle on 
probation. He continues to be verbally aggressive and believes 
that IDOC is out to get him. He feels as though he has been a 
"victim in a corrupt system." He does not feel as though he should 
have been given a "Rider" and does not believe he should have to 
do the things that are asked of him. 
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When he is not happy with an answer he will argue, 
complain, threaten to sue, shake his head, cry and manipulate until 
he either gets in trouble or gets what he wants. He has received 
multiple DOR's because will not adhere to what authority tells him 
to do. Mr. Taylor has shown an unwillingness to problem solve in a 
prosocial manner and is constantly taking the victim-stance when 
things do not go his way. He has stated many times that he has a 
girlfriend and a baby on the way and I feel that with Mr. Taylor's 
volatile behavior it would be unsafe to place him in a home with a 
small child. 
I feel at this time we have given Mr. Taylor every opportunity 
to want to do this program but he has spent more time fighting 
against it then he has identifying his own problems and working on 
them. He appears to be more concerned about his life being fair 
than he is about change. 
(PSI, pp.88-89.) The incidents forming the basis for this summary are 
documented in the remainder of the report and attached C-Notes. (PSI, pp.81-
106.) 
Taylor's extensive criminal record further validates the district court's 
decision not to give Taylor further opportunities on community supervision. While 
the present case constitutes Taylor's first felony conviction, Taylor's PSI 
references prior misdemeanor convictions for battery, domestic battery, violation 
of a protection order, possession of drug paraphernalia, petty theft, malicious 
injury to property, and driving without privileges. (PSI, pp.3-6.) Further, at the 
time of the preparation of his PSI, Taylor had an active warrant for a pending 
charge in South Carolina for sexual conduct with a minor. (PSI, p.7.) 
The district court considered the relevant information and reasonably 
determined that Taylor was not an appropriate candidate for community 
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supervision. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide 
Taylor yet another opportunity for probation, or to reward him with a reduced 
sentence. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Taylor has failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion. 
D. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
Taylor's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Taylor must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." !sL 
Whether a hearing should be given on a Rule 35 Motion is a matter for the 
discretion of the court. State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522, 525, 887 P.2d 67, 70 
(Ct. App. 1994). Where a defendant does not identify what evidence he might 
have produced at a Rule 35 hearing that he was unable to produce through 
affidavits, the district court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a 
hearing on the motion. State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830,839 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
In this case, less than two weeks after the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction following his second rider, Taylor filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence. (R., p.200.) Specifically, Taylor noted that he was 
expecting a child he wished to support, and requested that "his remaining 
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sentence be commuted to indeterminate time so that he may immediately go 
before the Parole Board." (Id.) The motion was "based on the fact that 
Defendant is suffering from depression and believes a great deal of his behavior 
is attributable to his mental state at the time of his rider." (Id.) Taylor did not 
reveal any new diagnosis or other circumstances to provide context or support 
for his assertion that he was suffering from depression. Nor did the motion 
specifically identify what type of evidence Taylor planned to present at any 
hearing. 
The district court denied the motion without a hearing. (R., pp.206-21 0.) 
After citing the applicable legal standards, the court correctly recognized that 
Taylor failed to provide any evidence that was not previously considered by the 
court. (Id.) 
Taylor's mental health issues were documented in previously-submitted 
sentencing materials relied on by the district court to make prior sentencing 
determinations. Taylor told his presentence investigator that he tried to hang 
himself with a sock while he was in jail. (PSI, p.10.) Taylor also stated that he 
was assessed by a doctor at the jail, and that he felt "he would benefit from 
mental health counseling to address his childhood." (Id.) According to a 
sUbstance abuse evaluation conducted in conjunction with his underlying 
sentencing, Taylor "scored in the moderate range of the Internal Mental Distress 
Scale," and that his self-reported symptoms, which included suicidal thoughts, 
indicated "the possible existence of a stress disorder." (PSI, p.46.) The 
evaluation also noted that Taylor reported that he not been diagnosed with or 
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received treatment for any mental, emotional, or psychological problem. (PSI, 
p.47.) The C-Notes associated with Taylor's second rider referenced Taylor's 
expressed feelings of depression and thoughts of self-harm. (PSI, p.90.) Finally, 
the fact that Taylor was expecting a child had also already been referenced in the 
Idaho Department of Corrections' report. (PSI, p.89.) All of this information was 
available for the court's consideration at the time it chose to relinquish 
jurisdiction, and prior to Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
In light of his failures on probation and in the retained jurisdiction program, 
Taylor cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in declining to 
reward him with another opportunity on probation, or with a reduced sentence. In 
light of his failure to support his I.C.R. 35 motion with new evidence or 
information regarding any asserted "depression," Taylor also failed to show that 
the district court abused its discretion either by denying the motion, or by 
declining Taylor's request for a hearing. This Court should therefore affirm the 
district court's orders relinquishing jurisdiction and denying Taylor's I.C.R. motion 
for reduction of sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders relinquishing jurisdiction over Taylor and denying Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion 
for reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2014. 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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